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ABSTRACT
In times of digitalization, established firms operating in the financial services sector increasingly form
alliances with start-up companies to satisfy the customers´ demand for rapid innovation and cope with the
growing dynamics of markets. Technology-enabled innovation challenges traditional business models of
incumbent institutions (e.g., banks) and requires them to adapt swiftly to the needs of the digital age.
However, young firms providing technological solutions for the financial services industry (fintechs) also
face difficulties, such as meeting regulatory requirements and winning the trust of potential customers. To
compensate for these shortcomings and to exploit synergies, banks and fintechs are increasingly pooling
their strengths in alliances. However, so far there is little empirical evidence on the motivation of both
sides, banks and fintechs, to collaborate. We use an explorative research design and conduct semistructured interviews to bridge that gap and shed light on what motivates banks and fintechs to join forces.
Building on that, the resulting motives are systematized in a novel conceptual framework and associated
with different types of alliances. Our results show that banks are particularly interested in benefiting from
rapid innovation without necessarily being involved in its development, while fintechs demand resources
and know-how to scale in the highly regulated financial sector. Our results have several practical
implications and open up opportunities for future research.
Keywords: Alliances, Digitalization, Banks, Digital Innovation, Fintech, Motives
JEL Codes: G21, G23, G34, M13

I.

Introduction

The rise of fintechs has drawn significant attention to the financial services
industry. Once believed that the technology-enabled services associated therewith would
enable young ventures to disrupt the banking sector, it has rather led to the co-existence
of start-ups and established firms and, as a result, to bank-fintech alliances (Bocks, 2017).
The advantages offered by fintechs have been identified in the area of customer
experience, whereas those of banks lie mainly in back-office processing and meeting
regulatory standards (Jenkins, 2016). Consequently, fintechs have established an image
representing innovation and exploration, whereas banks represent continuity and
seniority (Bussmann, 2017).
These aspects have been believed to be mutually exclusive, and experts have
thought this would lead to fierce competition (Nienaber, 2016). However, the coexistence of incumbents and start-ups can be beneficial. For example, in the beer
industry, the increasing number of microbreweries has broadened the beer market and
created new business opportunities and customer groups. Thus, many big players have
reconsidered their product portfolio or actively approached microbreweries. Similar
developments are unfolding in the financial services industry, where ongoing
digitalization requires extensive innovation (Brandl & Hornuf, 2017). Digital innovation
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incorporates processes, services/products, and business models enabled by digital
technologies (Fichman, Dos Santos, & Zheng, 2014).
The rise of fintechs has gained speed in light of these developments (Puschmann,
2017). Typically, fintechs are small, nimble start-ups that have taken advantage of new
digital technologies to deliver specific forms of financial services. Fintechs have partly
taken over functions previously reserved for incumbent banks; e.g., in payments, lending,
and investing (Eickhoff, Muntermann, & Weinrich, 2017).
For the rather conservative banking sector, aligning with fintechs requires
opening up their traditionally closed organizational boundaries to new digital market
participants and, more importantly, to new business models. From a fintechs´
perspective, alliances with banks may help to target their digitally augmented
services/products toward the large customer base of banks (Puschmann, 2017).
Furthermore, banks can support fintechs financially and help them overcome regulatory
boundaries. Some fintechs would probably not even have been able to enter the market
without resources of cooperating banks (Bömer & Maxin, 2018). Consequently, alliances
between banks and fintechs are emerging, even though the phenomenon remains novel
and the motivation, on both sides, for starting such partnerships is not yet well
understood. Extant literature has treated the “selection of partners […] as exogenous”
(Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008). Hence, the topic of partner selection has received little
attention, despite longstanding research emphasizing its crucial role in alliance formation
(Hitt, Tyler, Hardee, & Park, 1995). Accordingly, a more comprehensive understanding
of the motivation to collaborate is needed before analyzing the process of partner
selection and the nature of alliances (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000).
A study by Bömer & Maxin (2018) focusing on German fintechs provides first
insights into rationales of fintechs to cooperate with banks: market entry, increase of
profit, and enabling new products. However, it is important to take both partner’s
motives into account to understand the occurrence and character of bank-fintech
alliances. The present paper contributes to the existing literature by providing an indepth analysis of what motivates both sides, banks and fintechs, to join forces. To
generate insights into these largely unexplored business alliances, we conduct semistructured interviews with representatives of banks and fintechs, analyze the motives
mentioned and develop a conceptual framework to categorize the motives. Furthermore,
we develop a maturity index to shed light on how different motives of fintechs relate to
the respective form of alliance.
The paper is structured as follows: Section two outlines existing research on
digital innovation, the general motivation for business alliances, and recent
developments within the financial sector. Section three explains our methodology. The
identified motives are presented and systematized in section four. Section five discusses
the findings and concludes.
3
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II.

Background

A.
Digital Innovation
In order to compete in a business environment strongly disrupted by
technological developments, it is important for firms to participate in digital innovation
(Nambisan, Lyytinen, Majchrzak, & Song, 2017). Yoo, Henfridsson, and Lyytinen (2010,
p. 725) define digital innovation as “the carrying out of new combinations of digital and
physical components to produce novel products.” Financial innovation can be measured
in numbers of financial patents, which have increased in recent years (Lerner, 2002;
Miller, 1986). Digital innovation augments traditional physical products with digital
components (Yoo, Boland Jr, Lyytinen, & Majchrzak, 2012) and enhances the usage of
these products and the customer experience (Porter & Heppelmann, 2015). Thus, digital
technologies are being used to design new processes, products, services, and even
business models (Fichman et al., 2014).
While changes in financial institutions have often been driven by financial
innovation (Merton, 1995), the financial services industry has generally been perceived
as less innovative. However, digital innovation has started to impact established firms’
performance. As these firms often lack internal knowledge of digital technologies, they
often acquire and integrate complementary external knowledge (Hildebrandt, Hanelt,
Firk, & Kolbe, 2015). According to Yoo et al. (2012, p. 1401), “the convergence of
pervasive digital technology intensifies the degree of heterogeneity and the need for
dynamic balancing and integration of knowledge resources. For example, convergent
products may derive from completely different industries and unrelated bodies of
knowledge”. Consequently, the quest for new knowledge to develop digital innovation
is very likely to trigger various motives for banks and fintechs to close ranks in order to
gain access to external knowledge.
B.
Motivation of Alliance Partners
Alongside digital innovation, additional factors may elicit motives to form
alliances. For instance, increases in international inter-organizational collaboration are
attributed to disrupting changes in the market and ongoing globalization (Robson, 2002).
In management literature, several theoretical perspectives have been applied to explain
alliance formation, including transaction cost theory, resource dependency,
organizational learning, strategic positioning, and institutional theory (Nielsen, 2003).
Consequently, it is widely assumed that motivation to forge alliances is based on a
rationale that the perceived value or benefit from an alliance outweigh its costs (Geringer,
1991). Benefits that one alliance partner can offer the other include “skills, competencies,
capabilities, and knowledge” (Nielsen, 2003, p. 302), but these can only be fully captured
KLUS ET AL * STRATEGIC ALLIENCE BANKS AND FINTECH *
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when partners are carefully selected and both sides’ motives are well understood.
According to Osland and Yaprak (1995), alliances are formed to improve the allied
partners’ competitive position. Glaister (1996), for instance, identifies 16 different
motives in a sample of UK joint ventures with Western European partners: Gain
presence in a new market, obtain faster entry to markets, facilitate internal expansion,
compete against common competitors, obtain economies of scale, maintain market
position, exchange complementary technology, diversify products, concentrate on
higher-margin business, obtain faster payback on investment, spread out the risks of
large projects, share R&D costs, reduce competition, produce at lowest cost locations,
exchange patents/territories, and conform to foreign government policies. The wide
spectrum of motives shows that alliances “are becoming an essential feature of
companies’ overall organizational structure, and competitive advantage increasingly
depends not only on a company’s internal capabilities, but also on the types of its
alliances and the scope of its relationships with other companies” (Parkhe, 1991, pp.
579-580). Overall, the existing literature indicates an ongoing interest in academia
concerning corporate alliances and their underlying motives.
C.
Alliances in the Financial Services Industry
The growing importance of alliances is also influencing the financial services
industry. One contributing factor therein is digital innovation leading to increased
customer expectations. Customers are demanding financial services 24/7, and at the
greatest convenience. Moreover, digital technologies enable the provision of financial
services at any given location. Digital technologies create substantial cost saving
potentials for banks by reducing the traditional brick-and-mortar infrastructure and
streamlining the workforce as Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani, and Kambil (1994)
show with respect to the potential of information technology. New technologies also
facilitate the creation of new services and accessing new sources of revenue (Brynjolfsson
& McAfee, 2014). However, banks often lack the flexibility and know-how needed to
rapidly develop digital innovation, which gives fintechs a competitive advantage and
enables them to enter the market.
Existing literature distinguishes between different types of alliances: They can be
vertical, i.e. between sellers and buyers (Bouncken, Plüschke, Pesch, & Kraus, 2016),
horizontal, i.e. between competitors (Chou & Zolkiewski, 2017), or a combination of
both. Furthermore, alliances can be additive or complementary (Gulati, 1998; Hennart,
1988). Given the differences in skills and knowledge, which have been identified as
“ingredients” for alliances (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994), banks and fintechs appear
to be well suited candidates for complementary alliances.

5
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Due to high regulation, very specific service offerings, and the novelty of digital
innovation, more general assumptions and empirical findings regarding joint ventures
(Glaister, 1996) or classical R&D alliances (Bai & O'Brien, 2008) do not seem applicable.
III.

Methods

A.
Qualitative Protocol
We built our analysis upon primary and secondary data, where the alliances under
consideration have been identified through an in-depth analysis of press releases and an
online search for news sources and databases, such as ‘Crunchbase’ and ‘Payment and
Banking’. Within each case, the interviewees from the respective sides were selected
according to set criteria: First, they had to be actively involved in the alliance (in either
its formation or managing the modus operandi) and be in touch with the alliance partner
on a regular basis. Second, they had to hold a managerial position at the bank or a high
position in the fintech (typically, we interviewed founders). Lastly, they had to have a
profound understanding of the innovation developed within the alliance or the
innovation that initiated the alliance. To conduct an in-depth investigation of the motives
of both banks and fintechs for getting involved in an alliance, we follow Eisenhardt
(1989) and Yin (2009) and apply a qualitative research protocol comprising semistructured interviews with open-ended questions. This approach guarantees capturing all
perspectives and assessments expressed by the interviewees. With respect to potential
changes of a fintech´s requirements in different stages of development, we provide
additional data on the fintechs´ age, number of employees, and funding rounds. Building
on that, we derive insights into possible associations between their maturity level and
individual motives.
B.
Data and Sample
We identified 19 banks who announced alliances with 29 fintechs. An alliance is
considered as either a low-institutionalized customer-service provider relationship with
a long-term contract or a highly institutionalized type where a bank is financially invested
in a fintech. Interview partners were extracted from press releases and through a network
research on LinkedIn and Xing. This structured approach led to a detailed list,
comprising more than 70 potential interviewees. Following suggestions by Dillman and
Redline (2004), we addressed our request to the potential candidates in several waves
until a solid count of diverse interview partners was reached.
Given that bank-fintech alliances are a multi-layered phenomenon, we applied
an explorative case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989). For this, we conducted 18
interviews with an average duration of 65 minutes per interview to get a comprehensive
overview of what motivates banks and fintechs to collaborate. The final selection of
KLUS ET AL * STRATEGIC ALLIENCE BANKS AND FINTECH *
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interview partners is well-divided: In total, we collected data on 16 different cases (nine
banks and seven fintechs) within the financial services industry in Germany. For banks,
interview partners working for branch banks, online banks, and private banks have been
acquired. On the side of fintechs, a diverse set of experts from different fintech
categories (payments, investment/trading, and service and software) participated in the
interviews. In total, nine interviews were successfully conducted with banks, seven with
fintechs, and two with independent consultants who were not involved in any alliance of
our set but have been involved in bank-fintech alliances before. A brief overview of the
cases is presented in Table 1. We aimed for equal representation of fintechs and banks,
while the consultants were used to triangulate the findings. All interviews were audiorecorded and transcribed for further analysis. The interviews took place from August to
September 2017. Transcript coding was performed using MaxQDA v.12.2.
C.
Data Analysis
In order to analyze the interview data, we apply the Gioia methodology (Gioia,
Corley, & Hamilton, 2012) and derive 266 1st-order categories. Here, our main objective
was to “organize and make sense of the qualitative data” (Basit, 2003, p. 152) and
understand how the motives were perceived and understood by the interviewees.
Subsequently, we controlled for duplicates and similar content. This process was highly
iterative and involved studying each interview individually and in contrast to interviews
from the other (bank or fintech) group. After aggregating the 266 categories to 33 2ndorder themes, this detailed analysis of the motives enabled us to derive nine motives
from our 18 interviews. Three authors independently coded the studies to ensure the
accuracy of the coding process and there were no major discrepancies. To contrast
differences between fintechs of different levels of development, we created a maturity
index, which consists of a fintech’s age, employees, and funding rounds. First, we
converted all characteristics to a scale, ranging from 1 to 10, to avoid the influence of
outliers. Second, we calculated the average of the three scores for each fintech.

7
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Table 1. List of interviewees, their position and the type of alliance.
ID

Group

Description

Position

Startup incubator of a large, publicly listed
German bank
German subsidiary of a large, publicly listed
French bank
German direct bank, owned by a German
Landesbank
German publicly listed direct bank with
majority ownership by a large German bank
Private German bank with multi-channel
strategy
German publicly listed direct bank with
majority ownership by a large German bank
Private German bank with start-up platform for
fintechs
German direct bank, owned by a German
Landesbank

Director Venture
Vehicle Incubator
Director B2B and
Innovation

1

Bank

2

Bank

3

Bank

4

Bank

5

Bank

6

Bank

7

Bank

8

Bank

9

Bank

German specialist bank with fintech roots

10

Fintech

German online asset-management and
investment service provider

Director Trading
and Investing
Director Business
Development
Director Business
Development
Director Business
Development
Director Partner &
Innovation
Board Member and
Director B2B
Founder and Chief
Executive Officer

11

Fintech

German provider for Peer-to-Peer Payments

Founder

12

Fintech

Chief Customer
Officer

13

Fintech

German provider of banking API and data
analysis for banks
German provider of fully automated online
investment services

14

Fintech

German provider of content automation

Founder

15

Fintech

German online-payment processing platform

Head of Sales

16

Fintech

German social trading platform

17

Consultant

Consultant and advisor for venture capitalists

18

Consultant

Entrepreneur, investor and consultant

Director Investing

Founder

Head of
Partnerships
Fintech Mentor,
Venture Partner
Partner Consulting
for Fintechs

Type of Alliance

Incubator
Strategic
Partnership
Strategic
Partnership
Incubator
Outsourcing
Incubator
Strategic
Partnership
Strategic
Partnership
Outsourcing
Customer
Service Provider
Strategic
Partnership
Customer
Service Provider
Strategic
Partnership
Investor
(Incubator)
Investor
(Incubator)
Co-Shareholder

KLUS ET AL * STRATEGIC ALLIENCE BANKS AND FINTECH *
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IV.

Findings

This section presents the five motives for banks and the four motives for fintechs
and outlines a systematization thereof. The motives are backed up by quotations from
our interviewees (in italic with interviewee IDs given in brackets). An overview of each
respondent’s motive is provided in Table 2 and Table 3.
A.
Motives of Banks
Outsourcing. In eight out of nine cases analyzed, interviewees explained that banks
try to avoid using their own resources on new and risky innovations with unknown
results, and they attempt to save costs as “smaller firms with only a few employees can
simply produce considerably cheaper and achieve […] more attractive prices for the
market” (ID4). Banks use fintechs to reduce their own workload, so that their employees
can focus on core activities. Thus, banks “do not need to tie [up] additional manpower
as we already have enough other issues” (ID3). As the development of new business
areas would use up already scarce internal resources, one bank interviewee mentioned
that “we do not need to set up these internal resources anyway. We can acquire them
[from] the market just as well” (ID5) as “fintechs are, even with the API [Application
Programming Interface] development, faster and better than when we would use our
own internal resources we currently have in stock” (ID5). Banks also consider the extent
to which, and for what purpose, they outsource certain activities. Some banks consider
outsourcing a huge part of their value chain, such as digital payment services, while
others aim to establish a wholly new business field (ID6). In banking, services provided
by fintechs often remain in the background and unrecognized by customers as so-called
“white labels” that are “easier and faster to implement […] and use […] than to build
the whole system up by ourselves” (ID7). Further, these partnerships allow banks to
“broadly diversify their R&D activities as there is a very active fintech scene” (ID6).
In conclusion, banks prefer to focus on their core activities, as they are “not a
tech company nor an IT firm. We are a bank—we are good [at] financial consulting, we
are good [at] addressing behavioral finance topics […] We are not good at writing
computer programs” (ID5).
(Rapid) Innovation. In seven out of nine cases analyzed, banks were keen to
collaborate with fintechs to speed up innovation processes that would otherwise
consume too much time and financial and managerial resources. Since this explanation
applied to a major part of our sample, it reveals that banks are not only interested in
advanced ideas, but they also value well-thought-out turnkey solutions for their business.
Our interviewees stated that banks could innovate by themselves but have become “too
9
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large and too ponderous to promote internal change processes” (ID5). The interviewees
were aware that this is the result of old, traditional structures and “the IT implementation
of an idea would take 10 times longer, as these changes are tested more extensively until
everything, e.g. all regulatory requirements, fits” (ID6). Since regulators demand the
implementation or alteration of various processes multiple times per year, companies
outside of banks are able to screen these new demands and become “better and more
efficient or safer in these topics” (ID3). Thus, from a bank’s point of view, fintechs are
specialists who mainly focus on problems that impact most banks’ business.
Furthermore, implementation for fintechs is easy, as they have a “smaller set-up and are
faster” (ID8). Banks “only have to dock [the innovations] on [their] structure and then
[they] can work with them” (ID8).
Business Model Evolution. Our results further indicate that banks fear the growing
speed of change, as information about how banks operate has become increasingly
ubiquitous, and barriers to switching financial institutions are falling (ID4). They are also
afraid that “fintechs [will advance] to a point of digital transformation, where they are
able to replace current business models by providing scalable, digital, and intelligent
solutions” (ID6). Hence, banks are “searching for new business” (ID6) as they are feeling
“very high pressure—on the one side high regulatory pressure and on the other side lowinterest margins” (ID6). The interviewees stated that banks see opportunities within
digital financial services as an “extremely interesting and exciting business area, but we
know that our technical possibilities are by far not as advanced as the fintechs’. That’s
why we entered this strategic alliance” (ID2). These partnerships help to “identify and
launch new business models and consider all the different possible approaches” (ID6).
However, the interviewees also mentioned that some banks do not follow any clear
strategy (ID7). It can also be assumed that banks fear missing opportunities to establish
sustainable business models for the future, as “it is incredibly difficult to know what
happens where and since we also want to follow a digital strategy, everyone in the
management is anxious to follow this opportunity” (ID1). They also try to “convince the
workforce to catch up speed and acknowledge the urgency for an organizational
change—or, even more—to truly achieve a mindset change” (ID4). Hence, banks see
investments in fintechs as M&A activities (ID9).
Competitive Advantage. In four of the nine cases, banks were motivated to join
forces with fintechs to achieve competitive advantage and increase customer value.
Interestingly, banks acknowledged that fintechs might provide “something different,
better, higher, more advanced, or [something that] just goes down well with a customer”
(ID4). As, for instance, the German financial services industry becomes increasingly
competitive between traditional banks, every bank’s revenues based on the classic
interest-bearing business model decreases. “Every bank searches for additional potential
KLUS ET AL * STRATEGIC ALLIENCE BANKS AND FINTECH * 10
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for revenue creation. We can perhaps also offer real added value to meet our customers’
demands by using the data we have anyway” (ID3). However, fintechs usually offer their
services to a variety of banks, which diminishes the unique selling proposition as banks
prefer exclusive partnerships (ID3).
Learning. The banks’ motivation to collaborate with fintechs does not only relate
to the outsourcing of non-core activities; it is also important for banks to learn from the
fintechs’ way of thinking and to “break up and adjust existing processes, which becomes
harder the longer the process exists. It is, of course, easier for other companies which
can start from scratch and build up a blueprint of how to newly arrange a whole process”
(ID3). Their “different approach causes pinpricks to reconsider our traditional thinking”
(ID1). Thus, fintechs are seen as sparring partners that allow “in-depth discussions from
a different point of view […] and start processes in our bank which we probably would
never have seen nor pursued” (ID4). Hence, fintechs “use a very stringent approach in
the processing of information” (ID3) and provide an “impulse which is a very, very
exciting driver […] and always leads to cross-fertilization” (ID4).
Systematization of the Banks’ Motives. Table 2 presents banks’ motives for
collaborating with fintechs, sorted by relevance (measured by the frequency they were
mentioned). Accordingly, outsourcing seems to be the most essential motive, followed
by (rapid) innovation, business model evolution, competitive advantage, and learning.
The high relevance of outsourcing is interesting, as banks could become increasingly
dependent on their alliance partners when outsourcing their innovation. Taking into
account the equally important motive of “(rapid) innovation”, this creates a field of
tension because, although digital innovations can be offered, the banks themselves are
not becoming more innovative.
After assigning the motives to different types of alliances (customer-service
provider relationship and financial investment), the results were indistinctive, suggesting
that the motives have no significant impact on the chosen type of alliance. This indicates
that the phenomenon of alliances between banks and fintechs is still at an early stage,
where much is being tried and best practices are still unidentifiable. Although the motive
of “learning” is not among the most popular, it is mentioned in the case of customerservice provider relationships as well as financial investments. The existing literature on
organizational learning shows that a learning process requires many interfaces (Cegarra‐
Navarro, 2005; Knight, 2000), which are, however, relatively limited in case of both types
of alliance.
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Table 2. Overview of each bank’s motives.
1

Bank

Type of Alliance
with Fintech
Financial Investment

2

Bank

Customer Service Provider

3

Bank

Customer Service Provider

X

X

4

Bank

Financial Investment

X

X

5

Bank

Customer Service Provider

X

X

6

Bank

Financial Investment

X

X

X

X

7

Bank

Customer Service Provider

X

X

X

X

8

Bank

Customer Service Provider

X

X

X

9

Bank

Customer Service Provider

X

X

X

89%

78%

67%

ID Sector

Outsourcing

(Rapid)
Business Model
Innovation
Evolution

X

Learning

Competitive
Advantage

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

44%

44%

B.
Motives of Fintechs
Resources and Synergies. Surprisingly, the interviewed fintechs’ motives for
partnering with banks are less diverse compared to the banks’ motives. All seven fintech
representatives interviewed mentioned that they see their partners as a “customer that
also has the financial endowment to break new ground, which in turn helps us” (ID11).
Fintechs further benefit from the higher marketing budgets of banks and from other
synergies in marketing (ID11). Besides a customer-service provider relationship, “there
are banks which also invest in start-ups—which means that in some partnerships the
bank only wants to get to know [the fintech] and vice versa to investigate [whether] the
partnership might be expanded to an investment” (ID11). As soon as fintechs provide
services where any type of payment is involved, they need deep knowledge as well as
assets to ensure proper handling, and they also need a license to conform to regulations
(ID16, ID10). As these requirements can be a financial burden for fintechs, or sometimes
“impossible” according to European policies (ID11), three out of seven fintechs
mentioned sharing costs of conforming to regulations as an alliance motivation.
However, alongside being funded by banks, fintechs often wish to access banks’ data
and infrastructure to apply and test their products or services using realistic cases (ID10).
Trust and Credibility. Five out of seven respondents considered alliances as
valuable assets for obtaining trust and credibility. On the one hand, gaining trust and
credibility through alliances with established banks is central to attract end customers, as
“trust is very, very important and helps the investors to gain confidence in the product”
(ID16). Particularly in the “payment sector, the brand, or better said the trust, is very,
very important—especially in Germany” (ID11). On the other hand, fintechs wish to
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collaborate with more banks and get access to their customer base. Since failures in
alliances with fintechs might harm a banks’ reputation, banks become cautious as they
“are always a bit afraid of how long the fintech will still exist or if the processes are [as]
reliable as they are in old traditional institutions” (ID11). To overcome this burden,
fintechs wish to win partners for their products or services in order to establish a “trust
element” (ID11) and run a “flagship project to overcome reputational risk issues”
(ID11). Furthermore, they use feedback discussions to ask the banks to “assess out of
their own experience how the acceptance of the product or service among customers
will be” (ID12). Thus, fintechs use banks for “entrance to the market” (ID12).
Customer Acquisition. As incumbent banks can provide large customer bases,
which might be an even more compelling asset for fintechs than financial support, three
interviewees from fintechs described “higher prominence […] which means more
customers and transactions” (ID11) as a key motivation for alliances, as a database of
“around one million existing customers is incredibly tempting” (ID13). Five out of seven
fintechs mentioned access to the bank’s customer base as one of their motives to join
forces with a bank.
Learning. Only two fintechs mentioned intending to acquire knowledge about the
market and the industry (ID11), as banks “already have a long tradition” (ID10).
Alongside learning how banks think regarding partnerships and investments, fintechs
want to “understand more and more how the customer thinks and how industry
structures work” (ID11) or how banks provide “services for independent financial
service providers” (ID10).

Table 3. Overview of each fintech’s motives.
Regulations, Resources &
Synergies
X

Trust &
Credibility

10

Type of Alliance
with Bank
Customer Service Provider

11

Customer Service Provider

X

X

X

12

Customer Service Provider

X

X

X

13

Customer Service Provider

X

14

Financial Investment

X

X

15

Financial Investment

X

X

X

16

Financial Investment

X

X

X

100%

71%

71%

ID

Customer
Acquisition

Learning
X
X

X

29%

13

THE J14
OURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE VOLUME 21, NO.1 (SUMMER 2019) 1-23

Systematization of the Fintechs’ Motives. As with the banks’ motives, the fintechs’
motives can be arranged according to their relevance. Fulfilling regulatory requirements
and taking advantage of resources from banks seems to be highly relevant for fintechs
across the two identified types of alliances. Likewise, fintechs want to benefit from the
bank’s reputation and expand their customer base. The motive of learning could indicate
that the corresponding fintechs hope for interfaces and knowledge exchange when
choosing to collaborate with banks. This indication, however, needs to be verified with
an in-depth analysis.
To address this, we apply our maturity scale in Table 4, which represents the
average of the scaled fintech characteristics age, number of employees, and number of
funding rounds. The table shows that fintechs with a noticeable low maturity index are
particularly keen to learn from their alliance partners. Furthermore, all of the more
mature fintechs in our sample received a financial investment from their alliance
partners. They have the motive in common that a bank as an investor increases the
stakeholders’ trust and credibility in this fintech.

Table 4. Overview of each fintech’s motives and characteristics.
ID
10
11
12
13
14

Type of Alliance
with Bank
Customer Service
Provider
Customer Service
Provider
Customer Service
Provider
Customer Service
Provider
Financial Investment

Number
Regulations,
Trust &
Customer
of
Maturity
Resources &
Learning Age Employees
Credibility Acquisition
Funding Scale
Synergies
Rounds
X

X

3

7

0

1.6

X

1

7

1

1.7

X

X

X

X

X

X

3

30

3

5.7

X

3

47

2

6.0

9

45

1

7.2

X
X

X

15 Financial Investment

X

X

X

3

49

4

7.8

16 Financial Investment

X

X

X

9

35

3

8.2

C.
Motivation Framework
Most motives within the bank and fintech groups are unique and distinct, with
only one overlap (learning) between both groups. However, the picture becomes more
complex when looking at each sides’ different motives. The framework provided in
Figure 1 compares the motives of banks and fintechs. The size of the squares indicates,
comparatively, how frequently the respective motives were mentioned. The color-coding
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shows whether the motives are complementary (white) or neutral (grey). This
categorization reflects how the motives relate to each other in our cases.
Complementary motives are considered as beneficial for both sides of an alliance
and as supportive for fostering digital innovation. For example, the banks’ motive of
allying with fintechs to encourage innovation and speed up the introduction of financial
technology harmonizes well with the fintechs’ need for resources (e.g. banking licenses).
Further, banks aim to outsource certain activities, such as developing digital applications
for standard services (e.g. peer-to-peer money transfer apps), implementing new
regulatory rules, and servicing niche customer groups, and fintechs can cover these
activities and, at the same time, acquire more customers with the banks’ help. This may
lead to ‘coopetition’ as banks and fintechs cooperate and compete simultaneously
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000).
The only matching motive for forming an alliance was learning, as both banks
and fintechs mentioned it. Learning can improve both partners’ positioning through
making up for certain shortcomings, such as the banks’ lack of knowledge about digital
technologies or fintechs’ lack of knowledge on regulatory and legal specifications.
However, learning requires time and trust to create in-depth business knowledge (ID11).
Neutral motives are predominantly beneficial only to one partner within an
alliance. To improve their own competitive advantage, some banks use fintechs for
innovative (often also highly customized) application programming or specialized tasks.
Other banks use alliances with fintechs as an opportunity to evolve their business model.
Some fintechs pursue alliances with banks primarily to promote their products based on
the banks’ trust and credibility.

V.

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

As the financial services industry is considered relatively conservative, and
alliances with start-up companies are a novel phenomenon in this field, the topic of bankfintech alliances is highly relevant in both practice and science. Recent studies provide
suggestions for categorizing the fintech-industry (Puschmann, 2017) and explain the
emergence of a global fintech market (Haddad & Hornuf, 2016). However, the motives
on both sides, banks and fintechs, to collaborate have not been analyzed sufficiently so
far. Building on existing literature concerning fintechs, digital innovation, and alliancepartner selection, this paper identifies several motives of banks and fintechs to join
forces. To structure the heterogeneity of fintechs included in our sample, we take into
account their maturity level and different types of alliances.
The results show a variety of motives, which are often heterogeneous both within
the two groups and across the comparison. The clustering proposed in Figure 1 is a first
15
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approach for systemizing different motives in this context. The categories within the
framework are based on the frequency with which similar motives were mentioned,
which we take to indicate their relevance in certain types of alliances.
The findings show that banks tend to pursue outsourcing and rapid innovation,
while fintechs seek to benefit from the banks’ resources and reputation. Thus, a key
motivator for fintechs, beyond just having access to banks’ licenses to handle regulatory
requirements, is their desire for banks to act as guarantors to the customer. This is
important for fintechs because finance is a sensitive issue for customers who do not want
to entrust their money to small and unknown providers without regulation. Thus,
established banks have to protect their own reputation, which could be damaged by
alliance partners’ misconduct. This is especially valid as banks usually bring in a large
customer base, which fintechs also want access to. Bömer and Maxin (2018) support our
finding, as many of their interview participants also emphasize the relevance of access to
the banks´ customer base. Therefore, our results reveal that, while banks desire fintechs
to be more or less loosely integrated and exclusively outsourcing providers or customerservice providers, fintechs desire the competencies of banks that usually require deeper
integration.
Figure 1. Overview of the motives to form alliances.

KLUS ET AL * STRATEGIC ALLIENCE BANKS AND FINTECH * 16

THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE VOLUME 21, NO. 1 (SUMMER 2019) 1-23

Our finding that more mature fintechs in our sample have received a financial
investment indicates that they have to hold their own in the market for a while before
becoming an interesting candidate for institutional investors. However, it has to be
considered that our analysis is based on relatively small fintechs with a maximum of 50
employees. In a multinational study also considering larger fintechs, Hornuf, Klus,
Lohwasser, and Schwienbacher (2018) show that banks are more likely to invest in
relatively small fintechs while engaging in product-related collaborations with large
fintechs. One possible explanation is that fintechs need a start-up phase to become
attractive for financial investments. On the contrary, larger fintechs might be more
attractive for product-related collaborations as they are already established in the market
and provide a mature product portfolio.
Furthermore, our results show that trust and credibility are important motives of
fintechs to engage in alliances with banks. This finding is in line with Bömer and Maxin
(2018), who find that many fintechs confirm the existence of important spillover effects
in this context. In our sample, the motive of gaining trust and credibility seems
particularly related to those fintechs which have received a financial investment from
their collaborating bank. Fintechs may use a bank’s investment decision as a strong signal
for other stakeholders, whereas fintechs with comparatively loose forms of collaboration
might suffer from the risk of being replaced by another supplier with a more suitable
product.
The heterogeneity of the identified motives is not necessarily negative, as they
are not contradictory in all cases and thus not mutually exclusive. For example, banks’
strategic motivation to become more digital aligns with fintechs’ motivation to expand
their customer base. For example, the alliance partner’s expanded customer base
increases the visibility of the bank’s new orientation, yielding a common benefit.
A comparison of the motives shows that only learning applies to both alliance
partners. Fintechs are especially interested in building functioning and stable companies,
while banks want to learn more about the dynamics and agility of fintechs. Our analysis
of the maturity level further indicates that fintechs are particularly interested in learning
from banks when they are in their early stages. Organizational learning, or, more
precisely, inter-organizational learning, is an often-discussed topic in both academia and
practice, which is also relevant for bank-fintech alliances. Banks can either develop
innovative products themselves or outsource to fintechs for more rapid outcomes; if
banks want to become more innovative themselves, fintechs can serve as a companion
throughout the learning process. Theoretically, banks can then develop “fintech
products” in-house and no longer depend on alliances. Fintechs could also benefit from
temporary alliances by developing stable organizational structures, expanding their
customer base, and building their reputation. They may also be able to eventually break
away from the partnership to establish themselves as competitors.
17
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However, if banks do not strive for learning but rather want to save costs and
resources through outsourcing, they will become increasingly dependent on their
partners. Consequently, fintechs’ bargaining power may increase over time, and the
conditions for further collaboration could be renegotiated. Our findings show that banks
value achieving competitive advantage slightly more than learning. This poses a question
regarding the actual design of the alliances and the associated objectives of banks and
fintechs.
Knight (2000) states that trust, teamwork, and commitment are prerequisites for
learning in inter-organizational relationships. Corresponding factors require time and
interfaces in daily collaboration. Furthermore, Sobrero and Roberts (2001, p. 493)
identify that the performance outcomes of a partnership depend on “the type of
problem-solving activities being partitioned and their level of interdependency with the
rest of the project”. This stimulates a trade-off between a short-term efficiency increase
and a long-term learning process (Sobrero & Roberts, 2001). If a well-functioning
learning process is of interest, which seems to be the case for both banks and fintechs, a
customer-service provider relationship, which is limited to sharing the fintech product,
is insufficient. A closer type of alliance with close collaboration, efficient knowledge
management, well-coordinated interfaces, and appropriate organization is also required.
Since knowledge is a fundamental resource for gaining competitive advantage (Cegarra‐
Navarro, 2005), and learning promotes process and product co-innovation (Westerlund
& Rajala, 2010), we suggest that future research should investigate inter-organizational
learning in the context of bank-fintech alliances. In this setting, particular attention
should be paid to existing types of interaction to identify opportunities for interorganizational learning.
This paper focuses on what motivations both banks and fintechs have for joining
forces and considers the design of the alliance itself. However, due to the relatively small
number of companies interviewed, our study is limited, which restricts the validity of the
results. Additionally, only the German market was considered; thus, larger studies are
needed to confirm the robustness of the results. Furthermore, it should be investigated
why certain banks or fintechs form alliances and how other non-partnering banks and
fintechs address the challenges of their business environment.
Despite these limitations, the present paper outlines an approach to
systematizing the various motives for bank-fintech alliances. In addition to the abovementioned implications for future research, practical implications include that both
banks and fintechs should identify their respective motivations before getting involved
in an alliance. Their own motives should be compared with those of the potential partner
to identify synergies as well as potential conflicts of interest at an early stage.
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